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Mootness Fees 
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In response to a sharp increase in litigation challenging mergers, the 
Delaware Chancery Court issued the 2016 Trulia decision, which substantively 
reduced the attractiveness of Delaware as a forum for these suits. In this Article, 
we empirically assess the response of plaintiffs’ attorneys to these developments. 
Specifically, we document a troubling trend—the flight of merger litigation to 
federal court where these cases are overwhelmingly resolved through voluntary 
dismissals that provide no benefit to the plaintiff class but generate a payment 
to plaintiffs’ counsel in the form of a mootness fee. In 2018, for example, 77% of 
deals with litigation were challenged in federal court, and in 63% of litigated 
cases, plaintiffs’ attorneys received a mootness fee. This compares with 2014, 
when only 4% of deals with litigation had a filing in federal court and no 
mootness fees were awarded.  
The rise of the mootness fee and the shift to federal court raise several 
issues, including a lack of transparency in the quality and resolution of merger 
cases and an increased potential for blackmail litigation. These problems are 
compounded by the willingness of some courts to permit the payment of a 
mootness fee in connection with corrective disclosures that are immaterial but 
possibly helpful, a standard that we argue is unworkable and increases the 
potential for vexatious litigation. We argue that the widespread payment of 
mootness fees reflects an inappropriate tax on the judicial system and 
corporations.  
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Although we argue that a shift to federal courts is appropriate for 
litigation challenging the adequacy of merger disclosure, we maintain that a 
successful shift requires the federal courts to police the quality and resolution 
of merger litigation carefully. We conclude that federal courts should require 
that the payment of mootness fees be subject to judicial review. We further argue 
that the payment of a mootness fee should be conditioned on litigation resulting 
in a material corrective disclosure—the same legal standard required by Trulia. 
We propose that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure be amended to implement 
these requirements or alternatively that federal judges use their inherent 
authority to adopt these requirements. We ultimately view these changes as 
necessary to limit frivolous litigation and provide for transparency and judicial 
oversight of the litigation process. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The recent history of merger litigation—shareholder lawsuits 
challenging a merger—can best be described as schizophrenic.1 Starting 
in 2009, merger litigation rates climbed markedly. At the peak, in 2013, 
over 96% of publicly announced mergers were challenged in shareholder 
litigation.2 During this time period, merger litigation also extended to 
multiple jurisdictions, with the average deal in 2011 attracting five 
lawsuits.3 Delaware courts attracted a substantial proportion of these 
lawsuits; in 2015, 60% of all deals were challenged by a lawsuit filed in 
the Delaware Chancery Court.4  
This picture of merger litigation began to change about five 
years ago. Issuers adopted forum selection bylaws to prevent plaintiffs 
from filing litigation challenges in multiple states, and these bylaws 
were upheld first by the Delaware courts5 and subsequently by the 
legislature.6 The Delaware courts also responded in a series of decisions 
restricting the scope of merger litigation both substantively and 
procedurally.7  
The decisions limiting the scope of merger litigation culminated 
in In re Trulia Inc. Stockholder Litigation in 2016. In Trulia, the 
Delaware Chancery Court held that the Delaware courts would no 
longer approve merger litigation settlements that provided for a release 
 
 1. We documented this trend in a prior article, Matthew D. Cain, Jill E. Fisch, Steven 
Davidoff Solomon & Randall S. Thomas, The Shifting Tides of Merger Litigation, 71 VAND. L. REV. 
603 (2018).  
 2. Id. at 620. Private litigation is the dominant mechanism for challenging the price, 
fairness, or disclosures in connection with a public company merger. Enforcement actions by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) have typically been limited to particular transaction 
contexts such as reverse mergers and, even in such cases, are addressed exclusively to disclosure 
issues. See, e.g., Paul Rodel, A Look at Market Trends in Reverse Mergers, LAW360 (Mar. 21, 2017, 
2:05 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/904096/a-look-at-market-trends-in-reverse-mergers 
[https://perma.cc/GT2T-GKK6] (describing SEC enforcement actions in several reverse merger 
cases in 2011). 
 3. Matthew D. Cain & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Takeover Litigation in 2015, at 3 (Jan. 14, 
2016) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2715890 [https://perma.cc/7SNJ-
RSM6].  
 4. Cain et al., supra note 1, at 621. This led to charges of widespread frivolous merger 
litigation. See, e.g., Gregory A. Markel, Martin L. Seidel & Gillian G. Burns, Assessing a Judicial 
Solution to Abusive Merger Litigation, LAW360 (Nov. 19, 2015, 9:59 AM), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/728061/assessing-a-judicial-solution-to-abusive-merger-
litigation [https://perma.cc/F6GE-5H7D] (observing that “lawsuits are filed after virtually every 
public merger is announced, in many cases with little regard to the merits of the claim”). 
 5. Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 963 (Del. Ch. 2013). 
 6. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 115 (2019). 
 7. See, e.g., Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 305–06 (Del. 2015) (holding 
that the business judgment rule is “the appropriate standard of review for a post-closing damages 
action when a merger that is not subject to the entire fairness standard of review has been 
approved by a fully informed, uncoerced majority of the disinterested stockholders”). 
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and an award of attorneys’ fees if they did not achieve meaningful 
benefits for shareholders.8 The Trulia court specifically rejected a 
proposed settlement which offered to provide plaintiffs with additional 
nonmaterial disclosures in exchange for a broad release and a fee award 
to plaintiffs’ counsel.9 The court noted in dicta that, rather than 
resolving merger litigation through a court-approved settlement and fee 
award, the defendant could voluntarily make supplemental disclosures 
in response to the plaintiffs’ challenge, rendering the case moot.10 Six 
months later, in In re Xoom Corp. Stockholder Litigation, a Delaware 
court awarded a $50,000 mootness fee.11 The Xoom court stated that the 
Trulia requirement of materiality did not apply to mootness dismissals 
and that “a [mootness] fee can be awarded if the disclosure provides 
some benefit to stockholders, whether or not material to the vote.”12  
These substantive changes in Delaware law, coupled with the 
Trulia decision, reduced the attractiveness of merger litigation in 
Delaware. Delaware’s crackdown did not put an end to merger 
litigation, however. Instead, the changes resulted in the flight of merger 
litigation filings from Delaware to the federal courts.13 These federal 
suits repackaged state-law claims based on fiduciary duty into 
antifraud actions under section 14A and Rule 14a-9 thereunder.14 By 
2017, merger litigation rates, which had dipped to 74% of deals in 2016, 
rose to 83%, but only 10% of litigated deals faced a challenge in 
 
 8. In re Trulia Inc., Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 907–08 (Del. Ch. 2016). The Trulia 
court found that, because the supplemental disclosures obtained by the plaintiffs in the settlement 
were not material, they “provided no meaningful benefit to stockholders.” Id. at 899; see also 
Transcript of Settlement Hearing and Rulings of the Court at 37, 40, Assad v. World Energy Sols., 
Inc., No. 10324-CB (Del. Ch. Aug. 20, 2015) (statement of Chancellor Bouchard): 
[I]t should be pretty clear from some of the questions that I’m asking and some of the 
recent hearings . . . that there is a lot of concern in this court about nonmonetary 
settlements . . . there is going to be more scrutiny on some of the give and the get of 
these things. 
 9. Trulia, 129 A.3d at 907. 
 10. Id. at 897–98 (“The preferred scenario of a mootness dismissal appears to be catching 
on.”). 
 11. No. 11263-VCG, 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 117, at *14–15 (Del. Ch. Aug. 4, 2016). 
 12. Id. at *9–10. 
 13. Cain et al., supra note 1, at 631–32.  
 14. Federal court filings were consistent with the terms of issuer-adopted forum selection 
bylaws. The shift to the federal courts was in line with a proposal made by two of the coauthors of 
this article. See Jill E. Fisch, Sean J. Griffith & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Confronting the 
Peppercorn Settlement in Merger Litigation: An Empirical Analysis and a Proposal for Reform, 93 
TEX. L. REV. 557, 562, 601 (2015) (arguing that merger disclosure challenges should be litigated 
under federal securities laws rather than under Delaware law in order to reduce the frequency of 
frivolous, disclosure-only settlements). But see Phillip R. Sumpter, Adjusting Attorneys’ Fee 
Awards: The Delaware Court of Chancery’s Answer to Incentivizing Meritorious Disclosure-Only 
Settlements, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 669, 675 (2013) (defending the value of disclosure-only settlements 
in merger litigation). 
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Delaware, while 87% faced one in federal court.15 By 2018, the numbers 
were even more dramatic—5% of litigated deals were challenged in the 
Delaware courts, and 92% gave rise to a federal court lawsuit.16  
In prior work, we identified the shift to federal court and posited 
that the change was due to Trulia and other Delaware decisions.17 We 
document here an additional component of the shift to federal court: the 
increased and distinctive use of mootness dismissals. Although some 
commentators expected the move to federal court to result in greater 
scrutiny of plaintiffs’ allegations of disclosure violations—scrutiny that 
would result in the outright (and involuntary) dismissal of cases—that 
outcome has not yet materialized.18 Almost all of the federal court 
mootness dismissals take place without an adversarial process, 
meaningful judicial oversight, or an evaluation of whether the 
complaint even states a colorable claim. 
Based on what we can ascertain from public filings, post-Trulia 
cases filed in federal court are almost invariably terminated through a 
voluntary dismissal coupled with the payment of a mootness fee to the 
plaintiffs’ attorney.19 The mootness fee, which is typically in the range 
of $50,000 to $300,000, is purportedly compensation to the plaintiffs’ 
attorneys for obtaining supplemental disclosures in the proxy 
 
 15. Infra Table 1. The percentages do not sum to 100% because of multiple cases in multiple 
forums.  
 16. Infra Table 1. 
 17. See Cain et al., supra note 1. 
 18. Fisch et al., supra note 14, at 601–02. 
 19. See also Jack B. Jacobs, Andrew W. Stern & Jon W. Muenz, ‘Mootness Fees’ in Deal 
Litigation: An Argument for a Different Approach, BLOOMBERG L. 1 (Mar. 28, 2017), 
https://www.sidley.com/-/media/publications/bloomberg-bna-corporate-counsel-weekly_mootness-
fees-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/2PSB-TH6Y] (“Delaware courts have facilitated, if not encouraged, 
such fee applications by applying a standard more lenient than that applied in the context of a 
disclosure-only settlement fee application: the disclosure need only be ‘helpful’ to class members.”). 
In addition, the court has expressed a preference for resolving disclosure-only cases through 
dismissal and a mootness fee application even when the corrective disclosures meet the “plainly 
material” standard of Trulia. See In re BTU Int’l Stockholders Litig., No. 10310-CB, 2016 Del. Ch. 
LEXIS 212, at *4 (Del. Ch. Feb. 18, 2016); In re Trulia Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 898 
(Del. Ch. 2016) (“In using the term ‘plainly material,’ I mean that it should not be a close call that 
the supplemental information is material as that term is defined under Delaware law.”). 
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statement.20 Most federal courts do not review the request for dismissal 
or the proposed mootness fee payment.21  
We begin this Article in Part I by conducting an empirical 
analysis documenting the scope and pervasiveness of the mootness 
fee.22 We find that in 2018, 92% of completed deal cases were brought 
in federal court. In that same year, in at least 63% of litigated cases, 
plaintiffs’ attorneys received a mootness fee.23 Notably, mootness fees 
appear to have displaced formal settlements (coupled with releases) 
entirely in federal court litigation. As of January 2019, not a single case 
initiated in 2018 had resulted in a judgment or settlement—all of the 
dispositions as of that date have been either dismissals with the 
payment of mootness fees or outright dismissals.24 We also document a 
marked shift away from the Delaware courts. Plaintiffs’ attorneys are 
overwhelmingly bringing litigation challenges to mergers in other state 
courts and federal court.  
The rise of the mootness fee and the shift in merger litigation 
raise several issues, which we take up in Part II. We begin by 
considering the resolution of cases through corrective disclosure and a 
mootness fee as an alternative to a court-approved settlement. This 
development implicates several questions, including the quality of the 
mootness fee cases, the lack of transparency with respect to the size of 
the mootness fee, and, even in cases in which courts review the 
mootness fee, their limited ability to bring meaningful scrutiny to bear 
on the process by evaluating the quality of the supplemental 
disclosures. Notably, we observe that merger litigation is primarily 
 
 20. See Rosenfeld v. Time, Inc., No. 17cv9886 (DLC), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148394, at *2–3 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2018) (“Sometimes these settlements are characterized as ‘mootness fees,’ in 
which the corporation moots the lawsuit by making the allegedly withheld disclosures, and pays 
plaintiffs’ counsel a ‘voluntary’ fee in return.”); see also Joseph M. McLaughlin & Shannon K. 
McGovern, Mootness Fees in Disclosure-Focused Deal Litigation, N.Y.L.J. (Dec. 12, 2018, 2:46 PM), 
https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2018/12/12/mootness-fees-in-disclosure-focused-deal-
litigation/ [https://perma.cc/2RML-Q7GK] (reporting that “[m]ore recently, median mootness fees 
are closer to $250,000”).  
 21. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e) only requires court approval of a voluntary dismissal after class 
certification.  
 22. Our empirical analysis in this Article examines a dataset of merger litigation for deals 
over $100 million completed from 2003 through 2018. We limit our analysis to larger transactions, 
as do many similar studies, because larger deals are more likely to attract interest from the 
plaintiffs’ bar. See, e.g., Elliot J. Weiss & Lawrence J. White, File Early, Then Free Ride: How 
Delaware Law (Mis)Shapes Shareholder Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1797, 1823 n.87 (2004) 
(employing similar approach). 
 23. As we explain more fully infra note 41, we are limited in determining the full number of 
mootness fee payments because they are not always disclosed by the parties. 
 24. We note that the absence of fully adjudicated cases could just be the product of larger 
deals now being subject to a higher quality process such that the disclosures and procedures 
involved do not give rise to potential liability. This result, however, is in tension with the high 
percentage of deals that continue to be the subject of litigation. See infra Table 1. 
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brought in federal court by a small subset of plaintiffs’ law firms. Top 
plaintiffs’ firms, which have been documented in other research as 
consistently obtaining superior monetary settlements for shareholders, 
are not active in filing these cases.25 This suggests the possibility that 
these suits are not being filed with the expectation of obtaining a 
meaningful recovery for the plaintiff class but rather in order to obtain 
a quick disclosure and mootness fee, a practice that Judge Denise Cote 
of the Southern District of New York describes as conferring “no or little 
appreciable benefit” on target company shareholders.26  
We consider the challenge faced by the court in evaluating these 
disclosures in the context of an application for mootness fees. Although 
commentators have criticized the current materiality standard as 
providing insufficient guidance, we argue that the lesser standards 
applied by some courts in connection with the evaluation of a mootness 
fee (such as whether the supplemental disclosures are “helpful” or “of 
some value”) provide even less guidance and invite abusive litigation 
filed solely for the purpose of extracting a nominal fee payment.27 To 
the extent that mootness fees are paid in such cases, they are an 
inappropriate tax on the judicial system. Mootness fees and the 
accompanying litigation not only impose costs, they also do not appear 
to provide appreciable benefits to shareholders.  
A related and potentially more problematic issue is the 
negotiation and payment of mootness fees outside the judicial process. 
Although Delaware law requires disclosure and judicial review of 
mootness dismissals,28 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) 
do not explicitly mandate either notice to the shareholders or court 
approval when merger suits are voluntarily dismissed prior to class 
certification. The shift to federal court appears to be an attempt to 
leverage this potential gap in judicial oversight.  
We argue in Part III that the shift of merger litigation to federal 
court is appropriate and that federal rather than state disclosure law 
should set the legal standard for the required disclosures in merger and 
tender offer cases. We maintain, however, that a successful shift 
 
 25. C.N.V. Krishnan et al., Who Are the Top Law Firms? Assessing the Value of Plaintiffs’ 
Law Firms in Merger Litigation, 18 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 122, 124 (2016) (“[T]he top 5 firms, on 
average, have anywhere between around 5 and 10% each of total market share every sample 
year.”). 
 26. Rosenfeld v. Time Inc., No. 17cv9886 (DLC), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148394, at *12 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2018). 
 27. See, e.g., In re Xoom Corp. Stockholder Litig., No. 11263-VCG, 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 117, 
at *10 (Aug. 4, 2016) (awarding a $50,000 mootness fee after concluding that a disclosure that was 
merely “helpful” could justify a fee award in the context of a voluntary dismissal rather than a 
settlement). 
 28. See infra notes 71–73 and accompanying text. 
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requires the federal courts to police the quality and resolution of merger 
litigation carefully. Given the public interests involved and the nature 
of plaintiffs’ attorneys as quasi representatives of all shareholders, 
federal courts should require that mootness fees be submitted to the 
court and be subject to meaningful judicial oversight. We further argue 
that the payment of a mootness fee should be conditioned on litigation 
resulting in a material corrective disclosure—the same legal standard 
as required by Trulia. We believe that both requirements are consistent 
with the purpose of both the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 
(“PSLRA”),29 which is to limit frivolous litigation, and FRCP 23, which 
provides for transparency and judicial oversight of the class action 
process. 
I. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
To provide the reader with a deeper understanding of mootness 
fees and their prevalence today, we begin in this Section by presenting 
the results of an empirical analysis of the changing patterns of merger 
and acquisition (“M&A”) deal litigation over time. We construct a large 
sample of cases, then use our data to explore the number of case filings 
by year, the outcomes of those cases, the shift in case filings to federal 
court, the plaintiffs’ law firms that are bringing these cases, and the 
increasing resolution of these cases through voluntary dismissals 
coupled with the payment of mootness fees. 
A. Data Set 
For our analysis, we used a sample that includes 2,320 unique 
deals. We constructed our sample from the transactions included in the 
FactSet MergerMetrics database.30 These transactions were announced 
between 2003 and 2018 and met all of the five following criteria: (1) the 
target was a publicly traded U.S. firm, (2) the deal size was at least 
$100 million, (3) the offer price was at least $5 per share, (4) a merger 
agreement was signed and publicly disclosed through a filing with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), and (5) the transaction 
was completed as of January 2019.  
 
 29. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104–67, 109 Stat. 737 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 30. See Matthew D. Cain & Steven Davidoff Solomon, A Great Game: The Dynamics of State 
Competition and Litigation, 100 IOWA L. REV. 465, 486 n.102 (2015) (explaining that 
“MergerMetrics is a database of M&A data which offers ‘[i]n-depth research on mergers involving 
US public targets.’ ” (quoting FACTSET MERGERS, http://www.mergermetrics.com (last visited Oct. 
31, 2014))); see also FACTSET MERGERS https://www.mergermetrics.com (last visited Nov. 6, 2019) 
[https://perma.cc/7U34-82CR] for more information about the data set. 
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Completed deals during our sample period ranged from a low of 
58 in 2009 to a high of 287 in 2007.33 We observed a post-financial crisis 
high in 2016 and 2017, with 172 and 174 completed deals, respectively. 
The number of deal lawsuits filed peaked in 2017 at 144, with a low of 
44 in 2009. 
The first two columns of Table 1 provide data on the number of 
completed deals and the percentage of those deals with completed 
shareholder litigation. The percentage of deals with completed 
litigation fluctuated substantially over our sample period. Initially, 
during the period from 2003 to 2008, litigation rates ranged from 33% 
to 43% of completed deals. This changed dramatically after the financial 
crisis, rising to 76% in 2009 and then to 90% and higher between 2010 
and 2015. Litigation rates peaked in 2013 at 96% of all completed deals 
and then declined to 83% of deals in 2017 and 2018.  
These movements in the overall litigation rates for completed 
deals were accompanied by some dramatic shifts in the venues for deal 
litigation. For the period from 2003 to 2018, Table 1 also presents data 
on venues for deal case filings. The middle three columns break out 
these filings into three important categories: Delaware, other states, 
and the federal courts. These filing percentages do not sum to 100% 
because almost every deal can be challenged by a lawsuit in Delaware, 
a lawsuit in another state where the headquarters of the target 
company is located, and a lawsuit in federal court. The final column 
details the average number of suits filed per deal.  
 
 33. We have only forty-one deals in our sample in 2003, which underestimates the number 
for the full year because MergerMetrics coverage began in 2003 with only partial coverage in that 
year. 
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TABLE 1: FILINGS BY DEAL COMPLETION YEAR 
 
  Deals 
 Deals 
with 
Litigation 
 
Delaware* 
 
Other 
States*  Federal* 
Mean # 
of Suits 
Filed per 
Deal 
2003           41  34% 7% 100% 7% 1.6 
2004         140  33% 43% 78% 0% 2.7 
2005         159  37% 39% 66% 7% 2.3 
2006         210  39% 21% 82% 12% 2.3 
2007         287  42% 28% 86% 13% 3.2 
2008         152  43% 23% 92% 21% 2.9 
2009           58  76% 34% 98% 20% 3.8 
2010         134  90% 49% 88% 26% 4.5 
2011         131  92% 50% 88% 40% 5.4 
2012         121  90% 56% 88% 34% 5.1 
2013         120  96% 52% 83% 32% 4.8 
2014         117  91% 55% 73% 15% 4.5 
2015         147  89% 60% 51% 19% 4.2 
2016         172  74% 34% 62% 37% 3.4 
2017         174  83% 10% 19% 87% 2.5 
2018         157  83% 5% 18% 92% 2.7 
Total       2,320  66% 37% 68% 35% 3.7 
*Percentages sum to greater than 100% each year due to multi-jurisdictional 
filings. 
We begin by focusing on Delaware because the majority of public 
corporations are incorporated in Delaware and the Delaware Chancery 
Court is well-known for its expertise in corporate law issues. This 
makes Delaware an available venue for most deal cases, although, as 
the data show, its popularity among plaintiffs’ lawyers as a filing choice 
fluctuated substantially over our sample period. Roughly speaking, 
Delaware filings prior to 2009 ranged in the area of 30–40% of all 
completed deals, with a short-lived dip in 2006–2008.34 After 2010, as 
the percentage of deals with litigation jumped into the 90% region, 
Delaware filing percentages also shot up into the 50–60% area, where 
 
 34. This decline was attributed to plaintiffs’ lawyers filing suit outside of Delaware to seek 
better outcomes and created a concern that Delaware was “losing its cases.” John Armour, Bernard 
Black & Brian Cheffins, Is Delaware Losing Its Cases?, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 605, 607 
(2012).  
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they remained until 2015.35 By 2016, Delaware litigation rates, perhaps 
in response to Trulia, fell by almost 50%. This downward trend 
continued in 2017, falling to 10% of completed deals, and dropped even 
further in 2018 to 5% of completed deals. Without a question, the 
changes in Delaware law have effectively closed the courthouse doors 
to a tiny crack for deal litigation.36 
Where have the cases gone? If we look first at the data on “Other 
States,” the filing trends differ from what happened in Delaware. 
Initially, from 2004 to 2007, litigation rates varied from 66% to 86%, 
with an upward trend over the years 2008 and 2009, flattening out at 
88% in 2010–2012. At that point, we started to see a decline in litigation 
rates, probably because of the adoption of forum selection bylaws 
beginning in 2013 and accelerating after the Boilermakers Local 154 
Retirement Fund v. Chevron Corp. decision.37 This decline became 
precipitous in 2017–2018, when litigation rates in other states fell to 
18–19% of all completed deals. As with Delaware, plaintiffs’ lawyers are 
reducing their filings in other state courts, a trend that likely resulted 
from the increasing prevalence of forum selection bylaws. As before, we 
are left with the question: Where are all the deal cases going? 
The answer to that query appears when we look at the federal 
courts. Federal court filings were relatively small potatoes compared to 
those in Delaware and other states during the period from 2003 to 2009, 
constituting roughly 10–20% of filings. As the percentage of deals with 
litigation escalated in 2010, there was a corresponding increase in 
federal court litigation rates into the 30–40% range, but this tapered off 
into the high teens in 2014–2015. As Delaware clamped down on deal 
litigation in 2016 and forum selection bylaws began to limit the ability 
of plaintiffs to file in other state courts, filings shifted noticeably to 
federal courts, a shift that is not generally prevented by forum selection 
bylaws. This was followed by a flood of federal case filings in 2017 and 
a peak in 2018, with 92% of deal cases filed in federal court. 
 
 35. Only 65% of the deals in the sample involve targets incorporated or headquartered in 
Delaware. Practically speaking, this means that the percentage of Delaware filings cannot exceed 
65% and thus the 2015 60% filing rate is near the maximum litigation rate possible for Delaware. 
 36. For 2017–2018, we found only six cases that were filed only in Delaware, while there were 
an additional eighteen cases that were filed in both Delaware and other state courts. 
 37. 73 A.3d 934, 963 (Del. Ch. 2013) (upholding a Delaware-incorporated company’s adoption 
of a forum selection bylaw selecting Delaware as the situs for all state fiduciary duty litigation). 
In the wake of Boilermakers, Delaware firms moved quickly to adopt these types of bylaws. See 
Joseph A. Grundfest, The History and Evolution Of Intra-Corporate Forum Selection Clauses: An 
Empirical Analysis, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 333, 358–59 (2012) (documenting acceleration in the 
adoption of forum selection bylaws post-Boilermakers); Roberta Romano & Sarath Sanga, The 
Private Ordering Solution to Multiforum Shareholder Litigation, 14 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 31, 
33 (2017) (finding that as of 2014, the number of Delaware firms adopting forum selection bylaws 
was 746). 
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The final column of Table 1 shows that the mean number of suits 
filed per transaction has returned to pre–financial crisis levels. Prior to 
2009, this value ran from a low of 1.6 suits per litigated deal in 2003 to 
a high of 3.2 such suits. When deal litigation rates hit the 92% level in 
2011, the mean number of suits filed per litigated deal shot up to 5.4 
and continued to remain elevated until 2017, when it dropped to 2.5 
suits per litigated deal, indicating a decline in litigation intensity.38  
We turn next to litigation outcomes. Table 2 examines litigation 
settlements from 2003 to 2018. The first column represents the total 
number of deals with litigation for which we were able to determine how 
that litigation was resolved, using court documents, media reports, or 
other public sources. The second and third columns display the 
percentages of cases with known outcomes that settled or were 
dismissed. 
  
 
 38. As we noted in our earlier work, the number of suits filed per litigated deal was previously 
a good indicator of plaintiffs’ law firms’ interest in merger litigation and a solid measure of these 
attorneys’ “belief in their ability to bring cases that are sufficiently successful to warrant a 
reasonable fee award, either on the merits or through a settlement.” Cain et al., supra note 1, at 
629. With the increasing adoption of forum selection bylaws, this measure has become less 
meaningful. 
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TABLE 2: LITIGATION OUTCOMES BY DEAL COMPLETION YEAR 
 
  N Settled Dismissed 
Mootness 
Fees 
Settlements 
that Were 
Disclosure Only 
2003 11 55% 45% 0% 83% 
2004 44 66% 34% 0% 41% 
2005 56 54% 46% 0% 63% 
2006 78 71% 29% 0% 58% 
2007 109 68% 32% 0% 68% 
2008 65 69% 31% 0% 82% 
2009 41 73% 27% 0% 90% 
2010 110 82% 18% 0% 79% 
2011 110 80% 20% 0% 69% 
2012 102 77% 23% 1% 85% 
2013 109 77% 23% 0% 76% 
2014 104 63% 38% 3% 75% 
2015 124 46% 54% 14% 87% 
2016 111 41% 59% 20% 93% 
2017 135 9% 91% 65% 92% 
2018 120 0% 100% 63% N/A 
 
Settlement and dismissal percentages show quite a bit of 
movement over the sample period. During the early years (2003–2005), 
settlements tracked in the 55–65% range, which means that dismissals 
ran from 35–45% since the two numbers must sum to 100% for all of 
these cases.39 Settlement percentages rose to a higher level from 2006 
to 2013, running from a low of 68% to a high of 82%, before trending 
downward in 2014 (63%), 2015 (46%), and 2016 (41%), then dropping 
like a rock in 2017 to 9% and literally disappearing in 2018.40 
 
 39. There is only one case in our database which resulted in a verdict after trial, the case of 
In re Rural Metro Corp. Stockholders Litigation, 88 A.3d 54 (Del. Ch. 2014), which resulted in a 
judgment of $75.8 million against a defendant investment bank. See In re Rural/Metro Corp. 
Stockholders Litig., 102 A.3d 205, 213 (Del Ch. 2014). There was a related settlement of $11.6 
million in this case against other parties. See id. at 223. We classify this total amount as a 
settlement for purposes of our data analysis. We discuss the Rural Metro case infra at notes 93–
95 and accompanying text.   
 40. It is important to remember that we are reporting only completed deals with litigation as 
a known outcome. There were fifty-nine deals in our sample that had yet to be completed when we 
finalized our coding in January 2019. In addition, even for completed deals, unresolved litigation 
and settlement numbers trail case filings because of the delays associated with litigation. This is 
particularly true for trials or settlements providing monetary damages. As a result, for recent 
years, settlements are likely to be underrepresented in our data. 
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As noted above, merger cases are increasingly terminated 
through voluntary dismissals coupled with the payment of a mootness 
fee rather than through court-approved settlements. As a result, some 
of the dismissals in our data included the payment of a mootness fee by 
the defendants.41 The rising use of mootness fees is documented in the 
fourth column of Table 2. The payment of mootness fees was virtually 
nonexistent prior to 2014, but then began rising in the wake of Trulia. 
By 2015, mootness fees were paid in 14% of litigated cases, increasing 
to 20% of cases in 2016. In 2017, mootness fees were paid in 65% of 
litigated cases, and this practice continued at a similar level in 2018. 
The widespread payment of mootness fees and accompanying case 
dismissals reflects the adaptive litigation strategy of plaintiffs’ lawyers 
to Trulia.42  
The final column in Table 2 reports the percentage of disclosure-
only settlements. In recent years these settlements became widespread, 
reaching 93% of all settlements in 2016. This reflects the general 
demise of other types of settlements, such as, for example, amendment 
settlements, where the parties agree to a change in the terms of the 
merger agreement.43 Disclosure-only settlements are disfavored in 
Delaware after Trulia but could still have some lingering life in federal 
court.44  
Figure 2 graphically illustrates the sharp decline in settlement 
outcomes over recent years, along with the corresponding rise in 
mootness fees during the same time. 
  
 
 41. The presence of a mootness fee payment is frequently disclosed by the parties, although 
the amount of the fee paid is usually not disclosed. As a result, the figures in Table 2 for mootness 
fee payments should be regarded as a lower bound estimate for the number of cases in which such 
fees are actually paid. Our metric for determining whether a mootness fee was paid was thus 
(1) whether there was a specific disclosure related to a mootness fee, even if the fee was not 
disclosed; or (2) whether there were indicia that a mootness fee was paid, such as a supplemental 
disclosure which referred to a mootness issue. 
 42. For additional discussion, see Richard L. Renck, Court of Chancery Critically Reviewing 
“Mootness” Fee Applications, MONDAQ, http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/518244/Civil+Law/ 
Court+of+Chancery+Critically+Reviewing+Mootness+Fee+Applications (last updated Aug. 11, 
2016) [https://perma.cc/U3K8-S7MQ] (describing recent decisions evaluating mootness fee 
applications). 
 43. See Fisch et al., supra note 14, at 576 (describing amendment settlements). 
 44. In In re Walgreen Co. Shareholder Litigation, 832 F.3d 718 (7th Cir. 2016), the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit adopted the Trulia standard for review of disclosure-only 
settlements. However, it remains to be seen whether the other federal circuits will follow. To date, 
all federal courts to have considered the issue have followed the Trulia standard, though not all 
state courts have. See discussion infra notes 65–67 and accompanying text.  
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TABLE 3: MERGER CASES IN FEDERAL COURTS BY DEAL COMPLETION 
 
  
Federal 
Suits 
Federal 
Settle-
ments 
All Settled 
Cases in 
Federal 
Courts 
Mootness 
Fees Paid 
in Federal 
Courts 
Mootness 
Fees Paid 
in Federal 
Courts 
Non-
disclosure 
Settle-
ments 
2003 1 0 0% 0 N/A N/A 
2004 0 0 0% 0 N/A N/A 
2005 4 2 6% 0 N/A 50% 
2006 10 3 6% 0 N/A 0% 
2007 15 0 0% 0 N/A N/A 
2008 14 0 0% 0 N/A N/A 
2009 9 0 0% 0 N/A N/A 
2010 31 3 3% 0 N/A 33% 
2011 49 1 1% 0 N/A 100% 
2012 37 6 8% 0 N/A 33% 
2013 37 6 8% 0 N/A 17% 
2014 16 5 8% 0 0% 20% 
2015 25 10 14% 0 0% 0% 
2016 47 14 30% 10 67% 0% 
2017 125 5 45% 84 99% 0% 
2018 120 0 N/A 70 92% N/A 
Total 540 55 7% 164 92% 13% 
       
The fourth and fifth columns of Table 3 show that many of the 
dismissals in 2016–2018 resulted in the payment of mootness fees.46 For 
example, in 2016, ten federal cases resulted in the payment of mootness 
fees, which constituted 67% of the total number of mootness fee 
payment cases. In 2017, both these numbers increased, with the 
number of federal mootness cases rising to eighty-four and the 
percentage of the total number of all mootness fee cases going up to 
99%. Slightly lower, but still elevated, values of these variables were 
recorded in 2018. Meanwhile, as shown in the last column, 
nondisclosure settlements, which had once been relatively common in 
federal cases, completely disappeared.47  
 
 46. See supra note 41 for a discussion of how we determined the presence of a mootness fee. 
 47. All the federal court cases settled in 2015 through 2017 were disclosure-only settlements. 
This is not surprising; filings in federal court usually allege a disclosure violation under section 
14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 as a basis for jurisdiction, even if they also include 
pendent state law claims. Moreover, a federal court that dismisses a disclosure claim can choose 
not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state law fiduciary duty claims. 
     
1794 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:6:1777 
In Table 4, we examine the prevalence of multi-jurisdictional 
litigation in M&A cases from 2013 to 2018. The first column shows the 
frequency with which plaintiffs filed their class action litigation in state 
courts other than the Delaware Chancery Court. From 2013 to 2016, 
about 27% to 35% of all complaints filed were filed in these other state 
courts. By 2017, as the impact of forum selection bylaws and Trulia 
became apparent, the filing percentages dropped precipitously to 10%.  
The same pattern is apparent in Delaware-only cases. In the 
fourth column, we show cases that have been filed only in Delaware. 
While the range in 2013–2016 was wider than that for the other states’ 
data, the sharp decline in 2017–2018 was even more pronounced. Even 
if we include the cases filed in both Delaware and any other court 
(shown in the third column), by 2018, only 6% of all complaints were 
filed in Delaware Chancery Court (4% plus 2%).48 
 
TABLE 4: WHERE ARE DEAL CASES BEING FILED? 
 
  
Other 
States 
Federal 
+ Other 
State 
Delaware 
+ Other 
State/ 
Federal 
Delaware 
Only Federal Total 
2013 27% 16% 42% 10% 5% 100% 
2014 34% 7% 33% 22% 4% 100% 
2015 28% 6% 21% 39% 5% 100% 
2016 35% 17% 13% 20% 13% 100% 
2017 10% 7% 8% 3% 72% 100% 
2018 7% 11% 4% 2% 77% 100% 
       
The federal court data show the opposite trend. Prior to 2016, a 
relatively small percentage of cases were filed exclusively in federal 
court. This changed drastically in 2017, as the percentage of all deal 
complaints filed only in federal court soared to over 70%. This trend 
toward filing in federal court is further heightened if we add the filings 
that were made in both federal court and other state courts, shown in 
the second column. 
Figure 3 illustrates these shifts graphically. The solid area 
across the top in 2017 and 2018 shows that the shift into federal courts 
has swamped all other venues. 
 
 
 48. This differs slightly from the rate shown in Table 1 due to rounding. 
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TABLE 5: CASE FILINGS BY INCORPORATION 
 
Panel A: Delaware-Incorporated Targets  
  
Other 
States 
Federal + 
Other 
State 
Delaware + 
Other State/ 
Federal 
Delaware 
Only Federal Total 
2013 13% 6% 62% 16% 3% 100% 
2014 13% 0% 50% 34% 3% 100% 
2015 8% 2% 31% 57% 1% 100% 
2016 23% 12% 19% 31% 15% 100% 
2017 5% 4% 11% 4% 75% 100% 
2018 4% 6% 6% 2% 82% 100% 
Panel B: Non–Delaware-Incorporated Targets 
 
  
Other 
States 
Federal + 
Other 
State 
Delaware + 
Other State/ 
Federal 
Delaware 
Only Federal Total 
2013 55% 34% 0% 0% 11% 100% 
2014 73% 22% 0% 0% 5% 100% 
2015 68% 14% 2% 2% 14% 100% 
2016 60% 28% 2% 0% 9% 100% 
2017 21% 13% 0% 0% 66% 100% 
2018 12% 18% 0% 0% 69% 100% 
Panel C: Case Outcomes by State of Incorporation   
 Delaware-Incorporated Non–Delaware-Incorporated 
  Settled Dismissed 
Mootness 
Fees* Settled Dismissed 
Mootness 
Fees* 
2013 74% 26% 0% 84% 16% 0% 
2014 57% 43% 3% 74% 26% 3% 
2015 34% 66% 20% 72% 28% 0% 
2016 29% 71% 27% 71% 29% 3% 
2017 3% 97% 73% 20% 80% 50% 
2018 0% 100% 64% 0% 100% 63% 
*Mootness fees are paid only in cases classified as “dismissed.” 
Panel C demonstrates the remarkably sharp upward trend in 
the payment of mootness fees. As discussed above, these fees were 
relatively rare prior to 2015. The change appears to stem from 
Chancellor Bouchard’s decision in Trulia, which implicitly gave judicial 
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approval to the practice.49 For Delaware-incorporated firms, resolution 
of litigation by means of a voluntary dismissal coupled with the 
payment of a mootness fee rose from 20% of all cases in 2015 to a high 
of 73% of these cases in 2017, before dropping slightly to 64% of cases 
in 2018. Cases involving non-Delaware corporations demonstrated a 
slightly slower shift to mootness fees; the rise began in earnest in 2017 
and has just recently reached the same level as for Delaware 
corporations.50 
To gain more insight into which deal litigation is still being filed 
only in the Delaware Chancery Court, in untabulated data, we broke 
out the completed transaction merger cases for 2017 and 2018 and 
examined their characteristics. For the six cases that were filed solely 
in Delaware during that time period, four of them challenged going-
private transactions or management buyouts (“MBOs”), which are 
generally viewed as deals with potential conflicts of interest, meaning 
they potentially have greater value for plaintiffs. One of these cases 
settled with a substantial increase in the deal price paid to the 
shareholders, four others were dismissed (three had mootness fee 
payments), and one case is still pending. Based on this limited set of 
observations, it appears that plaintiffs are still willing to file higher-
quality deal cases in Delaware. 
Table 6 reports data about the ten plaintiffs’ law firms that filed 
the most federal court merger cases in 2017, 2018 and January of 2019. 
The first column shows the names of the law firms, while the second 
displays the number of deals that they challenged by filing a federal 
lawsuit. The total number of completed deals with federal lawsuits is 
250. Market share is defined as the number of cases filed by the 
particular law firm divided by the total number of deals, or the first 
column divided by 250. The number of deals sums to more than 250, 
and the percentages of market share sum to more than 100%, because 
multiple law firms frequently file suit in connection with a given deal. 
The third and fourth columns provide data on the percentage of each 
firm’s cases that were dismissed, and the percentage of each firm’s cases 
in which a mootness fee was paid, respectively. The final column lists 
the percentage of the firm’s cases that settled. 
 
 
 49. See In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 897 (Del. Ch. 2016) (describing the 
payment of mootness fees as a “preferred scenario”). 
 50. The figures in Table 5 do not take into account pending litigation that will be settled or 
dismissed at a later date. They therefore understate ultimate settlement figures and dismissal 
percentages for litigation brought in the last few years. For further discussion of this issue, see 
supra note 40.  
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TABLE 6: PLAINTIFFS’ LAW FIRM RANKINGS IN FILING FEDERAL 
MERGER LAWSUITS 
 
Law Firm Deals 
Market 
Share51  
Cases 
Dismissed 
Without 
Fees 
Cases 
Dismissed 
with 
Mootness 
Fees 
Cases 
Settled 
Rigrodsky & Long 149 60% 30% 68% 1% 
RM Law 119 48% 34% 65% 2% 
Levi & Korsinsky 78 31% 23% 76% 1% 
Faruqi & Faruqi 56 22% 25% 71% 4% 
Monteverde & 
Associates 45 18% 16% 80% 4% 
WeissLaw 50 20% 30% 68% 2% 
Brodsky Smith 22 9% 27% 73% 0% 
O'Kelly Ernst & 
Joyce, LLC 15 6% 33% 67% 0% 
Kendall Law 
Group 12 5% 42% 58% 0% 
Matorin Law 
Office 12 5% 42% 58% 0% 
Total Cases 250     
 
The six most active plaintiffs’ law firms in merger litigation filed 
a disproportionate percentage of the federal cases. In fact, the top two 
firms collectively filed 268 cases, which exceeds the total number of 
completed deals in the sample with federal litigation during this period. 
When we examined the filings of these two firms more closely, we found 
that every single complaint filed by RM Law was in a deal that was also 
being challenged by Rigrodsky & Long.52 The next four firms filed 
 
 51. Market Share is Number of Deals / Total Cases. Total Cases includes deals completed in 
2017, 2018, and January 2019 with federal lawsuit filings. Number of Deals sums to more than 
250 and Market Share sums to more than 100% since multiple firms may file on a given 
transaction.  
 52. For purposes of filing merger litigation cases, the two firms appear to act on a coordinated 
basis. 
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another 229 federal merger lawsuits. Taken together, these six law 
firms in total filed 497 federal lawsuits or almost two lawsuits per 
completed deal. 
Within the group, there was some variation in how frequently 
the law firm was able to obtain a mootness fee. For example, 
Monteverde & Associates had the highest percentage (80%) of cases in 
which they obtained a mootness fee, while RM Law was only paid such 
a fee in just under two-thirds of its cases (65%). Notably, each of these 
law firms settled a very small percentage of their cases, ranging from 
1% to 4% of the federal cases that they filed. Based on these data, we 
conclude that these law firms appear to be more interested in collecting 
mootness fees than in actively litigating the cases that they file. 
 To summarize our findings, there have been at least four 
significant changes in merger litigation practice post-Trulia. First, 
Delaware is no longer the center of this litigation; rather, the main 
action has moved to federal court. Second, settlements have virtually 
disappeared, and virtually all the cases are terminated by dismissals. 
Third, most of the dismissals are voluntary and are accompanied by the 
payment of a mootness fee; the percentage of dismissals coupled with 
mootness fees has gone up significantly, especially for Delaware-
incorporated firms. Fourth, in 2017–2018, merger litigation was being 
filed largely by six plaintiffs’ law firms, none of which were represented 
among the top-tier plaintiffs’ firms who had been actively litigating (and 
winning) deal cases in earlier years.53  
II. ASSESSING MOOTNESS FEES  
A. Resolution by Dismissal and Mootness Fee 
In order to understand the significance of the shift in litigation, 
we next examine the manner in which merger cases are currently being 
resolved. Prior to Trulia, the standard resolution of a litigation 
challenge to a deal was the rapid negotiation of a settlement between 
the plaintiff class and the target company.54 The settlement typically 
required the target to make supplemental disclosures in the proxy 
statement, provided for a general release of all claims by the plaintiff 
 
 53. Krishnan et al., supra note 25, at 131–33 (naming “Robbins Geller Rudman and Dowd, 
Grant and Eisenhofer, Bernstein Litowitz Berger and Grossman, Milberg, and Kessler Topaz 
Meltzer and Check” the top five plaintiffs’ firms from 2006–2012).  
 54. See, e.g., Fisch et al., supra note 14, at 466 (reporting that “nearly 70% of merger claims 
settle while the rest are dismissed”). 
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class, and sought a court-approved fee award to plaintiffs’ counsel.55 If 
approved, the settlement bought the target peace from the prospect of 
further litigation in exchange for the fee award, even though, as some 
commentators have suggested, the value provided by the supplemental 
disclosures to the plaintiff shareholders was questionable.56 
In a prior article, Confronting the Peppercorn Settlement in 
Merger Litigation, two of the authors of this Article examined the value 
of these types of settlements.57 The authors found that disclosure-only 
settlements appeared, on average, to offer little value.58 More 
particularly, these settlements, and the “corrective disclosures” they 
entailed, did not significantly change the votes in merger transactions, 
something that one might expect if the disclosures revealed material 
information.59 In that article, the authors recommended that the 
exclusive forum for these suits be federal court because issues of 
materiality would both be highlighted in a complaint predicated on 
section 14(a) and are within the core competence of the federal courts, 
which are accustomed to dealing with questions involving the 
materiality of alleged disclosure violations.60  
The Trulia decision cited these findings in concluding that, in 
light of the limited value of these disclosure-only settlements, the courts 
should not routinely approve them.61 Instead, Trulia held that judicial 
approval of a disclosure-only settlement was appropriate, if and only if, 
the supplemental disclosures were “plainly material.”62 Disclosures 
that did not meet that standard would not provide the plaintiff class 
with sufficient consideration to justify a release of any potential 
claims.63 On the facts in the Trulia case itself, the court determined that 
the supplemental disclosures provided pursuant to the settlement were 
neither material nor even helpful to the shareholders and therefore 
refused to approve the proposed settlement.64 
Outside of Delaware, courts have differed in the degree to which 
they have accepted Trulia. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
 
 55. Id. (explaining that “[t]he vast majority of suits, however, settle exclusively for 
supplemental disclosure in the form of additional information in the merger proxy statement”). 
 56. See id. at 559–60 (describing scholarly skepticism of the value of disclosure-only 
settlements). 
 57. See id. 
 58. Id. at 615. 
 59. See id. at 561 (reporting empirical findings that “disclosure-only settlements do not 
appear to affect shareholder voting in any way”). 
 60. Id. at 595–96. 
 61. In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 895 n.29 (Del. Ch. 2016). 
 62. Id. at 898.  
 63. Id. at 907. 
 64. Id. 
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Circuit explicitly adopted Trulia’s “plainly material” standard,65 and 
several federal district courts adopted Trulia as well.66 But not all 
courts agreed. For example, in Gordon v. Verizon Communications, Inc., 
the New York First Department adopted a lesser standard of review, 
concluding that approval of a proposed settlement was warranted 
where the settlement conferred “some benefit” on the plaintiff class.67 
The absence of a settlement and a release does not preclude the 
possibility of a fee award for plaintiffs’ counsel. The Trulia court 
recognized that, in a case in which the defendants voluntarily 
supplement their disclosures in response to a litigation challenge, 
thereby mooting the litigation, plaintiffs’ counsel can apply to the court 
for a mootness fee.68 The Trulia court characterized this as the 
“preferred scenario” because, in the absence of a settlement agreement, 
defendants would have an incentive to oppose excessive fee awards, and 
the court’s determination of an appropriate fee would have the benefit 
of an adversarial process.69 
Litigation in Delaware has developed in accordance with these 
principles. In subsequent cases, the Delaware Chancery Court awarded 
mootness fees under a more lenient legal standard than that required 
by Trulia. As one commentator explained, in Delaware, “A mootness 
process involves a company providing supplemental disclosures; the 
plaintiff stockholders not providing a formal release of claims; and, 
through an adversarial court proceeding, the parties litigating what fee 
(if any) is appropriate for plaintiffs counsel for their having obtained 
disclosure that ‘moots’ the disclosure claims made.”70 For example, the 
 
 65. In re Walgreen Co. Stockholder Litig., 832 F.3d 718, 725 (7th Cir. 2016). 
 66. See House v. Akorn, Inc., 385 F. Supp. 3d 616, 623 (N.D. Ill. 2019) (applying Trulia 
standard to reverse payment of mootness fee); Sanchez v. IXYS Corp., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
170332, *14 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 2018) (“I adopt the ‘plainly material’ standard here.”); In re Hatteras 
Fin., Inc., S’holder Litig., 286 F. Supp. 3d 727, 731, 740 (M.D.N.C. 2017) (approving a settlement 
that resulted in supplemental disclosures that were “technically material” but of “marginal” 
benefit to the class, and approving fee award of $350,790); Bushansky v. Remy Int’l, Inc., 262 F. 
Supp. 3d 742, 746 (S.D. Ind. 2017) (dismissing proposed settlement); Malone v. CST Brands, Inc., 
No. SA–16–CA–0955–FB, 2016 WL 8258791, at *7 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 10, 2016) (denying motion for 
preliminary injunction); In re CytRx Corp. Stockholder Derivative Litig., No. CV 14-6414-GHK 
(PJWx), 2016 WL 6571265, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2016) (rejecting motion to set aside judgment).  
 67. 148 A.D.3d 146, 159–60 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017). But see City Trading Fund v. Nye, 59 Misc. 
3d 477, 494 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2018) (concluding that this standard did not require award of a mootness 
fee for disclosures that were of no value). In Maryland, a court held that the courts will not award 
mootness fees for corrective disclosures unless the original litigation was “meritorious when 
filed.” Dexter v. ZAIS Fin. Corp., No. 24-C-16-004740, 2016 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS 11, at *11–12 (Md. 
Cir. Ct. Dec. 8, 2016).  
 68. 129 A.3d at 896–97. 
 69.  Id. at 897. 
 70. Steven Epstein, Scott B. Luftglass & Gail Weinstein, A Post-Trulia Success Story of 
Disclosure-Based Settlement, LAW360 (Apr. 12, 2016, 10:34 AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/ 
782927/a-post-trulia-success-story-of-disclosure-based-settlement [https://perma.cc/YAG2-A4L6]. 
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Chancery Court in Xoom awarded counsel a $50,000 mootness fee and 
concluded that a disclosure that was merely “helpful” could nonetheless 
justify a fee award in the context of a voluntary dismissal rather than 
a settlement.71  
Notably, however, Delaware has a specific procedure for the 
oversight of mootness fee payments. Payment of a mootness fee in 
connection with the voluntary dismissal of a proposed class action in 
Delaware requires notice to the putative class and court approval.72 The 
Delaware courts have subjected mootness fees to careful scrutiny, at 
least in some cases,73 and on occasion have denied plaintiffs’ 
applications for mootness fees.74  
Outside of Delaware, the process has not developed in 
accordance with the prediction of the Peppercorn article—that federal 
courts would scrutinize the resolution of merger litigation in the same 
manner as the Delaware courts.75 As noted above, several federal courts 
have applied the Trulia standard to disclosure-only settlements.76 
However, with one exception discussed below,77 the federal courts have 
not imposed the same scrutiny on mootness fee payments. Instead, it 
has become common for plaintiffs to dismiss their complaints 
voluntarily and then negotiate privately with the target company for 
payment of a mootness fee without seeking court approval of that fee.78 
As a result, attorneys’ fees in mootness payments in federal court cases 
 
 71. In re Xoom Corp. Stockholder Litig., No. 11263-VCG, 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 117, at *10, 
*15 (Del. Ch. Aug. 4, 2016).  
 72. See In re Harman Int’l Indus., Inc. Stockholders Litig., No. 13001-CB, 2016 Del. Ch. 
LEXIS 291, at *5 (Del. Ch. Dec. 22, 2016) (retaining jurisdiction for the purpose of resolving 
plaintiffs’ fee application following voluntary dismissal); In re Zalicus Inc. Stockholders Litig., No. 
9602-CB, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 15, at *3 (Jan. 16, 2015) (reasoning that “notice of the joint 
application must be given to the putative class because of ‘the risk of buy off’ presented by the 
proposed fee”) (quoting In re Advanced Mammography Sys., Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 14831, 1996 
Del. Ch. LEXIS 132, at *2 (Oct. 30, 1996)). 
 73. See, e.g., In re Xoom, 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 117, at *10, *14–15 (finding that a mootness 
fee was appropriate when the disclosure provided some benefit to stockholders). 
 74. See, e.g., In re Zalicus, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 15, at *3, *5 (denying mootness fee because 
notice of the fee was not given to the putative class of stockholders). The approach in other state 
courts varies. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.  
 75. See Fisch et al., supra note 14, at 612. 
 76. See supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
 77. See infra notes 111–112 and accompanying text. 
 78. It appears that plaintiffs, at least in some cases, were able to employ this same process 
in Delaware. In In re Harman Int’l Indus., Inc. Stockholders Litig., No. 13001-CB, 2016 Del. Ch. 
LEXIS 291, at *5 (Del. Ch. Dec. 22, 2016), for example, the court issued an order granting plaintiffs’ 
request for voluntary dismissal and expressly retaining jurisdiction for the purpose of determining 
the plaintiffs’ fee application. Subsequently, however, the defendants agreed to pay plaintiffs’ 
counsel a fee of $195,000, and the amount of that fee does not appear to have been submitted to 
the court for approval. See Exhibit A to Stipulated [Proposed] Order Closing the Case at 3, In re 
Harman Int’l Indus., Inc. Stockholders Litig., No. 13001-CB (Del. Ch. Sept. 1, 2017) (indicating 
agreed-upon fee and stating that the court had not determined the reasonableness of the fee).  
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are not generally disclosed by the parties. Based on our earlier research, 
median mootness fees ranged from $200,000 to $450,000 over the period 
2014 to 2017.79 Our more recent conversations with attorneys suggest 
that these values may have declined to a range of $50,000 to $150,000, 
depending on the negotiation between the attorneys involved. 
Because mootness fees are paid in connection with cases that are 
voluntarily dismissed prior to class certification, federal courts have 
almost uniformly failed to oversee, approve, or even require disclosure 
of these fees. This lack of federal court supervision, and the dynamic 
which has developed post-Trulia, is why merger litigation rates remain 
at high levels (and why these cases have moved from Delaware to the 
federal courts). Although the mootness fee dynamic appears to have 
reduced the size of plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees, it has thus far permitted 
them to achieve a result similar to what used to be available in 
Delaware, except without the formal global release.  
Several cases have grappled with the issue of whether the 
federal courts have the power to oversee the dismissal and mootness fee 
dynamic. In Berg v. Akorn, Inc., plaintiffs argued that, because the case 
was voluntarily dismissed prior to class certification, the federal court 
lacked jurisdiction to review the fee award.80 Notably, the FRCP do not 
explicitly require judicial approval of a voluntary dismissal if a case has 
not yet been certified as a class action.81 In Akorn, however, another 
shareholder moved to intervene, arguing that the payment of the 
mootness fee injured the interests of other shareholders.82 Similarly, 
the court in Rosenfeld v. Time, Inc. concluded that the voluntary 
dismissal of a complaint prior to class certification does not constitute 
an adjudication, reasoning that, as a result, the court did not even have 
jurisdiction under the PSLRA to evaluate whether Rule 11 sanctions 
are warranted.83 These limitations have not just limited judicial 
scrutiny of mootness fee payments; in most cases, the courts have not 
even required that such payments be disclosed. 
 
 79. Cain et al., supra note 1, at 625 tbl.3. This is consistent with the information reported in 
the popular press. See McLaughlin & McGovern, supra note 20 (reporting that “[m]ore recently, 
median mootness fees are closer to $250,000”). 
 80. See No. 17 C 5016, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 192278, at *3–4 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 21, 2017) 
(reporting that plaintiffs filed a document with the court reporting that “Defendants have agreed 
to provide Plaintiffs with a single payment of $322,500 in attorneys’ fees and expenses to resolve 
any and all Fee Claims, and thus there are no Fee Claims to be adjudicated by the Court”). 
 81. Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e) (“The claims, issues, or defenses of a certified class—or a class 
proposed to be certified for purposes of settlement—may be settled, voluntarily dismissed, or 
compromised only with the court’s approval.”). 
 82. See 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 192278, at *4–5. 
 83. No. 17cv9886 (DLC), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148394, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2018). 
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Moreover, the courts’ failure to require disclosure of the 
existence and amount of mootness fees raises the possibility that 
plaintiffs’ attorneys are receiving mootness fees for valueless 
disclosures or disclosures that were not causally related to the filing of 
the complaint. 84 Indeed, it is hard to believe that the disclosures made 
in connection with mootness fees are more valuable than those that 
were previously made in connection with disclosure-only settlements 
pursuant to court oversight, many of which were found to be of little or 
no value.85 One indicator that this is the case is that if plaintiffs’ 
attorneys had valuable cases, they would likely bring them in Delaware 
courts, which have historically awarded higher attorneys’ fees in 
meritorious cases.  
Although the size of the mootness fee payment in any particular 
case seems relatively small, mootness fees impose real costs on the 
judicial system and on companies. We can use the data from Table 2 to 
estimate the total direct dollar cost of mootness fees in merger 
litigation. Taking the number of merger litigation cases filed annually 
and multiplying this number of cases by the percentage of cases where 
mootness fees are paid,86 we can calculate the annual number of cases 
where such fees are paid. We can then multiply this value by the 
median mootness payments discussed above87 and arrive at an 
estimate. For example, in 2017, we have 135 deal cases, of which 65% 
resulted in a mootness fee payment, or approximately 88 cases. If we 
use our data on mootness fees, the median mootness fee payment was 
$265,000 per case.88 Doing the math, the estimated (lower bound) for 
 
 84. To the extent that target boards are agreeing to pay attorneys’ fees for litigation that has 
not provided a benefit to the target company shareholders, they are arguably wasting corporate 
assets. A waste analysis in the context of mootness fees differs in an important way from the 
analysis of disclosure-only settlements because the defendant has not received the consideration 
of a release from future litigation. Because the dismissal only reaches the individual claims of the 
filing shareholder (claims that would not be cost-effective to litigate on a standalone basis), other 
shareholders are not barred from filing a similar complaint and raising identical issues. It is thus 
questionable whether the justification of litigation settlement and deterrence is an appropriate 
defense to a waste claim. See generally In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 748–
49 (Del. Ch. 2005) (detailing the standard of waste under Delaware law). 
 85. See Fisch et al., supra note 14, at 615 (concluding that, because disclosure-only 
settlements do not have a demonstrable effect on shareholder voting, they “do not produce a 
corporate benefit”). 
 86. This number provides a lower bound on the number of cases in which mootness fees are 
paid because there may be some unreported mootness fee payments that we were unable to 
identify.  
 87. See discussion supra note 79 and accompanying text.   
 88. Cain et al., supra note 1, at 625 tbl.3. As we note below, this figure may be higher than 
the mootness fee amounts currently paid.  
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total mootness fees in 2017 would be $23.32 million.89 While this 
number may seem small in comparison to the total dollar value of the 
deals being completed, it is not insignificant. 
B. The Problem of Mootness Fees 
The lack of oversight, the continuing prevalence of merger 
litigation, and the payment of attorneys’ fees in mootness fee cases all 
raise troubling issues. We discuss these issues in this Section, including 
the risk of blackmail litigation and the lack of transparency. We 
conclude by discussing whether the current mootness fee review 
standards in both state and federal court, to the extent they exist, are 
workable. 
1. Risk of Blackmail Litigation 
The primary concerns with mootness fee litigation are related to 
those involving disclosure-only settlements. Prior to Trulia, a 
substantial number of merger cases were settled for additional so-called 
corrective disclosures.90 From the defendant’s perspective, the primary 
virtue of a settlement was that it resulted in a global release precluding 
further litigation challenges to the merger.91 In effect, the plaintiffs’ 
attorneys were selling a form of insurance, which allowed the deal 
parties to obtain a release from all breach of fiduciary duty claims as 
well as any other claims arising from the transaction. This was a 
valuable right, and the defendants were willing to pay for it.  
For the settlement to have value then, it required that the 
plaintiff class be certified, at least for settlement purposes. As a result, 
the settlement and fee award were subject to review in Delaware by the 
court under the substantial benefit test or, in federal court, 
FRCP 23(e).92 The court thus had some oversight of the process, and 
would in many instances refuse to approve the settlement if the benefit 
 
 89. Of course, this value is highly sensitive to changes in the assumptions used in the 
calculations, but even at $100,000 per case on average, the amount is $8.8 million per year in costs. 
From conversations with practitioners, we believe that the $235,000 figure is closer to the norm 
and understates the average amounts paid.  
 90. See Fisch et al., supra note 14, at 572 (indicating this was the case for 60% of 
transactions). 
 91. See, e.g., In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 892 (Del. Ch. 2016) (discussing 
defendants’ motivations for agreeing to disclosure only settlements). 
 92. See, e.g., In re Sauer-Danfoss Inc. S’holders Litig., 65 A.3d 1116, 1141 (Del. Ch. 2011) 
(reviewing request for attorneys’ fees and awarding $75,000 fee on the basis that “minimal fees 
[are appropriate] when deal litigation confers minimal benefits”); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2)(C)(iii) 
(requiring the court to consider, inter alia, “the terms of any proposed award of attorney’s fees” 
before approving any proposed settlement or dismissal of class).  
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was not apparent. In some prominent cases, including in In re Rural 
Metro Corp. Stockholders Litigation,93 other plaintiffs’ law firms 
intervened and took control of the case to prosecute more valuable 
substantive claims.94 This court-supervised process eventually 
culminated in the Trulia decision, in which the court determined that 
many disclosure-only settlements provided little benefit to the class and 
held that, in such cases, no fee award was appropriate.95 Importantly, 
by imposing meaningful judicial scrutiny on proposed disclosure-only 
settlements, Trulia limited the potential for plaintiffs’ attorneys to 
exercise a form of blackmail by filing weak cases that defendants could 
not litigate on a cost-effective basis.  
Because mootness fee cases outside of Delaware are not subject 
to the same judicial scrutiny, they too raise the potential for a form of 
blackmail. More explicitly, although the plaintiffs’ law firm can hold out 
the prospect of litigating the issue of whether the target’s disclosure is 
sufficient, the prototypical mootness dismissal involves a case in which 
there is no reasonable prospect of identifying a disclosure deficiency, 
and the only rationale for payment is that it is less costly for the 
defendants to pay the mootness fee than to challenge the complaint on 
the merits.96 In other words, as the City Trading Fund v. Nye court put 
it, “The very point of the lawsuit was simply to get paid—by the 
shareholders—to go away. This is a pernicious motive for lawsuit.”97  
In conversations with defense and plaintiffs’ attorneys, both 
report that this dynamic appears to be driving the payment of mootness 
fees. The fact that these cases are overwhelmingly brought by a small 
handful of non–top-tier plaintiffs’ law firms, firms that are not 
commonly involved in litigating cases that result in substantial 
recoveries to the plaintiff class, is consistent with this dynamic. These 
firms are well-known to the defense bar and their appearance on the 
complaint signals to the defense bar that the mootness fee dance is to 
begin. 
This situation is exacerbated by the lack of judicial oversight in 
federal courts. If the plaintiffs’ attorneys receive a fee in cases in which 
their efforts do not provide a benefit, they lack any incentive to limit 
litigation to cases involving truly problematic disclosures. Instead, 
 
 93. 88 A.3d 54 (Del. Ch. 2014). 
 94. Joel Edan Friedlander, How Rural/Metro Exposed the Systemic Problem of Disclosure 
Settlements, 40 DEL. J. CORP. L. 877, 890–91 (2016).  
 95. See Trulia, 129 A.3d at 895, 907. 
 96. At least one defense counsel has informed us that some repeat buyers have refused to pay 
this fee, preferring to litigate. As one might expect, after the first assertion of this right, 
subsequent transactions have not been met with mootness fee demands.  
 97. City Trading Fund v. Nye, 59 Misc. 3d 477, 513 n.26 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2018).  
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plaintiffs’ firms continue to file these cases, expecting them to result in 
a quick resolution and fee payment. This pattern is readily apparent in 
our data. 
2. Lack of Transparency 
Our second objection to mootness fees is the lack of 
transparency. In our empirical data collection, we found that payments 
of mootness fees were rarely disclosed and, outside of Delaware, 
mootness fees were virtually never disclosed in court documents,98 
although they sometimes appeared in a press release or corporate filing 
with the SEC. Because of the lack of transparency, it is uncertain in 
many cases whether a mootness fee is even paid. For example, in some 
cases, disclosure is made with specific reference to mooting a pending 
complaint without stating whether a mootness fee will be paid. In other 
cases, there is only supplemental disclosure with a subsequent 
dismissal but no mention of attempting to moot the pending case. In a 
third set of cases, there is no supplemental disclosure and no record of 
a mootness fee paid, simply a dismissal. 
For example, on August 10, 2018, Radisys filed a proxy 
statement in connection with a proposed merger with Reliance 
Industries.99 Plaintiffs filed a complaint in federal court on August 17, 
2018, alleging disclosure violations.100 On August 28, that complaint 
was voluntarily dismissed, and Radisys filed an 8-K announcing that 
the dismissals had been made following supplemental disclosures and 
that plaintiffs’ counsel “stated their intent to seek mootness fees from 
RSYS.”101 Neither the court docket nor Radisys’s corporate disclosures 
provide any additional information as to whether a mootness fee was 
subsequently paid and, if so, the amount of that fee.102  
 
 98. Also, as stated in Trulia, Delaware requires that mootness fees be disclosed to 
shareholders. Trulia, 129 A.3d at 898. This disclosure may take the form of an 8-K filing. See, e.g., 
VAALCO Energy, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), at 2 (Apr. 26, 2016) (disclosing mootness fee). 
When the practice of dismissal coupled with payment of a mootness fee initially developed, it was 
the norm to disclose that a fee was being paid as well as the amount of the fee. The practice has 
now changed, and mootness fees are rarely disclosed.  
 99. Radisys Corp., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) (Aug. 10, 2018), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/873044/000119312518246139/d502287ddefm14a.htm 
[https://perma.cc/XHY5-5VGC]. 
 100. Plaintiffs also filed a state court complaint, which was similarly dismissed. Radisys Corp., 
Current Report (Form 8-K) (Aug. 28, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/ 
data/873044/000087304418000097/a082918mergerlitigation.htm [https://perma.cc/MH6Y-6PUT].  
 101. Id.  
 102. U.S. District Court District of Oregon (Portland (3)) Civil Docket for Case #: 3:18-cv-
01525-SI, Shemali v. Radisys Corp., No. 3:18-cv-01525-SI (D. Or. Aug. 28, 2018), 
http://securities.stanford.edu/filings-documents/1067/RC00_15/2018817_f02k_18CV01525.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/K7NE-3ZDT]. 
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A transparent process would require disclosure of these fees both 
to the court and in a public filing. Disclosure would provide an 
opportunity for affected stockholders to step in and object, thereby 
offering the possibility of an adversarial process even in a case in which 
the target board is unwilling to defend against the complaint.103  
Disclosures also provide a level of court oversight which ensures 
the integrity of this process and interrupts the current blackmail 
dynamic of mootness fees. This principle applies even if the costs— 
anywhere from approximately $5 million to $25 million per year—are 
dismissed as relatively trivial. In addition, oversight allows for court 
intervention to ensure that an actual benefit is being provided in these 
circumstances. As we discuss in the next Section, we believe that courts 
should be more rigorous in the level of oversight they provide. 
3. The Standard in Mootness Cases Is Unworkable 
Judicial oversight of mootness fee applications does not, 
however, fully address the problem. Remember that the standard, at 
least as annunciated in Xoom, is that a mootness fee can be awarded “if 
the disclosure provides some benefit to stockholders, whether or not 
material to the vote.”104 The problem with this standard is that it 
appears to be contrary to the long precedent on disclosure and 
materiality as set forth in the federal securities law, starting with TSC 
Industries v. Northway, Inc.105 Critically, it rewards plaintiffs for filing 
complaints in cases in which there is no violation of the law—because 
section 14(a) imposes liability only for “material” disclosure violations.  
Awarding a mootness fee for disclosures that provide minimal 
value to the plaintiff class—“tell me more” disclosures in the words of 
the Nye court—is both a low standard and judicially unmanageable.106 
As the court observed in Nye, “Since companies are only legally required 
to disclose all material facts in connection with a merger, every single 
proxy will surely omit at least some immaterial fact that might be of 
some benefit to the shareholders.”107 Consequently, providing a fee 
award for any cases that secure a disclosure that is immaterial yet 
 
 103. See, e.g., Rosenfeld v. Time, Inc., No. 17cv9886 (DLC), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148394 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2018); Berg v. Akorn, Inc., No. 17 C 5016, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 192278 (N.D. 
Ill. Nov. 21, 2017).  
 104. In re Xoom Corp. Stockholder Litig., 2016 Del Ch. LEXIS 117, at *10 (Aug. 4, 2016). 
 105. 426 U.S. 438, 459 (1976) (“The general standard of materiality that we think best 
comports with the policies of Rule 14a-9 is as follows: An omitted fact is material if there is a 
substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how 
to vote.”).  
 106. City Trading Fund v. Nye, 59 Misc. 3d 477, 513 n.26 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2018). 
 107. Id.  
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provides some benefit “incentivizes a lawsuit in connection with every 
single merger.”108 Information that is not legally required should not be 
the basis of a fee award. 
III. MERGER DISCLOSURE ISSUES SHOULD BE A MATTER OF  
FEDERAL LAW AND THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE  
SHOULD ADDRESS MOOTNESS FEES 
A. The Case for Federal Oversight 
The fundamental question underlying judicial review of 
mootness fees is whether this should be a matter for a state or federal 
court. As discussed above, two of us argued in the Peppercorn article 
that federal courts rather than state courts should police merger 
disclosure.109 We based our arguments on the core competencies of the 
federal courts and the copious amount of federal law on this issue. 
Succinctly, the federal courts have an eighty-five–year history of 
regulating and policing securities disclosure. This has supplied a robust 
body of case law concerning the appropriate standards of disclosure. 
The SEC has adopted an enforcement and review process that also 
includes rulemaking and guidance to issuers on the proper scope and 
level of disclosure. The federal rules have also more directly engaged 
with issues surrounding frivolous lawsuits. Indeed, the PSLRA was 
adopted to police these suits, and both the SEC and the Supreme Court 
have articulated the standards behind Rule 10b-5, Rule 14(a), and other 
disclosure liability rules, including the requirements of scienter and 
materiality. In this regard, Trulia can be seen as an adoption of that 
principle. Trulia asserted that materiality as annunciated by the 
federal courts should be the guiding standard for regulating disclosure-
only litigation.110 It was a statement that these standards would govern 
when the state court decided the validity of a settlement. Some federal 
courts have adopted Trulia’s precepts. For example, in In re Walgreen 
Co. Stockholder Litigation, Judge Richard Posner adopted the Trulia 
standard for the Seventh Circuit.111 He wrote that these settlements 
should be rejected unless the disclosure was “plainly material.”112 
Trulia’s standard has also been adopted in other courts.113  
 
 108. Id. 
 109. See Fisch et al., supra note 14. 
 110. In re Trulia Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 898–99 (Del. Ch. 2016). 
 111. In re Walgreen Co. Stockholder Litig., 832 F.3d 718, 725 (7th Cir. 2016). 
 112. Id. 
 113. See In re Subway Footlong Sandwich Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 869 F.3d 551, 557 
(7th Cir. 2017); see also Bushansky v. Remy Int’l, Inc., 262 F. Supp. 3d 742, 754 (S.D. Ind. 2017). 
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Walgreen was decided in the context of FRCP 23 and the 
requirements set out thereunder for judicial review of class action 
settlements. FRCP 23, as currently written, does not apply to mootness 
fees because the case is dismissed prior to class certification. As a result, 
courts must find an alternative basis for overseeing the mootness fee 
payment. 
In the recent Akorn decision, the court concluded that it could 
exercise its “inherent authority to rectify the injustice that occurred as 
a result [of the dismissal and mootness fee payment].”114 In Akorn, 
plaintiffs filed a motion for entry of stipulation and voluntary dismissal. 
A supporting document indicated that the parties had agreed to an 
attorneys’ fee payment of $322,500.115 The parties then argued to the 
court that the “matter is fully resolved and no further issues remain in 
dispute, and, there being no reason for the Court to retain jurisdiction 
over this matter, the case should be closed for all purposes.”116  
A shareholder sought to intervene to object to the requested fee 
award on the basis that the case was “part of a ‘racket,’ pursued ‘for the 
sole purpose of obtaining fees for the plaintiffs’ counsel.’ ”117 In an 
opinion issued on June 24, 2019, the judge in Akorn ordered that the 
plaintiffs’ attorneys return the fee award.118 The judge noted that this 
was not a request for approval of a class action settlement. Nonetheless, 
the court cited Walgreen for the proposition that “a class action that 
seeks only worthless benefits for the class should be dismissed out of 
hand.”119 The court then ordered the fees returned, stating:  
The quick settlements obviously took place in an effort to avoid the judicial review this 
decision imposes. This is the “racket” described in Walgreen, which stands the purpose of 
Rule 23’s class mechanism on its head; this sharp practice “must end.” Plaintiffs’ cases 
should have been “dismissed out of hand.”120 
Akorn is important because it shows that a court can use its 
inherent equitable authority to police the payment of a mootness fee.121 
 
 114. House v. Akorn, Inc., 385 F. Supp. 3d 616, 623 (N.D. Ill. 2019). 
 115. Berg v. Akorn, Inc., No. 17 C 5016, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 192278, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 
21, 2017). 
 116. Id. (quoting Stipulation and Proposed Order Closing Case for All Purposes at 6, Berg, 
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 192278 (No. 17 C 5016)).  
 117. Id. (quoting the record). 
 118. Akorn, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 623. 
 119. Id. at 619 (quoting In re Walgreen Co. Stockholder Litig., 832 F.3d 718, 724 (7th Cir. 
2016)). 
 120. Id. at 623 (citations omitted) (quoting Walgreen, 832 F.3d at 724). 
 121. See supra notes 105–108 and accompanying text. See also Pearson v. Target Corp., 893 
F.3d 980, 982 (7th Cir. 2018) (noting that counsel and parties should not be permitted to “leverage” 
the class mechanism “for a purely personal gain”). As of the publication date of this Article, the 
plaintiffs in Akorn are appealing the district court’s decision to the Seventh Circuit on the grounds 
that “[s]ince there was no longer a case pending before [the judge], and since a federal judge’s 
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The court in Akorn did not rely on the PSLRA or general disclosure 
precedent. Although Akorn offers a path for courts to apply the 
Walgreen standard to mootness fees, the Akorn court’s decision was only 
possible because the parties had disclosed the payment of a mootness 
fee and because an objector sought to intervene, triggering the court 
decision. In most cases, neither the court nor potential objectors are 
aware that a mootness fee has been paid, and no such objection is ever 
raised. This is why, in the next Section, we propose an amendment to 
the FRCP to expressly permit the review conducted by the Akorn court. 
B. Amendment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
We propose that the federal courts should follow Delaware’s 
approach and require both disclosure and judicial approval of mootness 
fee payments. We recommend that the federal courts require that any 
proposed mootness fee be reported to the court when there is a 
voluntary dismissal of a proposed class action. The court should also be 
required to approve that payment, even if the class has not been 
certified.122 Finally, we recommend that the defendant corporation be 
required to file a Form 8-K or make another public disclosure, prior to 
the judicial hearing, alerting investors to any request by plaintiffs’ 
counsel for a mootness fee, the position of the board of directors with 
respect to the request, and the amount of the proposed payment.123 
We believe that the federal courts could adopt these 
requirements on their own, as the court in Akorn did.124 If federal courts 
choose to do so, they could limit these requirements to the context of 
class action merger litigation.  
 
authority to issue orders depends (with immaterial exceptions) on the existence of a case, [the 
judge’s] order was void.” Joint Consolidated Opening Brief And Required Short Appendix For 
Plaintiffs-Appellants Shaun A. House And Demetrios Pullos, House v. Akorn, Inc., Nos. 1:17-cv-
05018 and 1:17-cv-05026 (7th Cir. Oct. 16, 2019) (quoting Smith v. Potter, 513 F.3d 782–83 (7th 
Cir. 2008)). We note that an amendment to the FRCP would address any potential ambiguity on 
this issue. 
 122. We note that merger litigation filed as a derivative suit is already subject to FED. R. CIV. 
P. 23.1(c)’s requirement that any derivative case can be “settled, voluntarily dismissed, or 
compromised only with the court’s approval.” This provision is designed to permit objectors to 
“question the overall fairness of a settlement and to prevent a secret settlement in which the 
plaintiff and his attorney receive a clandestine payment from the defendant.” JAMES D. COX & 
THOMAS LEE HAZEN, COX & HAZEN ON CORPORATIONS 988 (2d ed. 2003). It seems inequitable that 
plaintiffs can circumvent these judicial protections merely by recasting a derivative complaint as 
one that purports to be a class action. 
 123. Although the federal courts could potentially order such disclosures based on their power 
to protect the shareholders of the defendant corporation, these requirements are arguably better 
implemented through SEC rulemaking. 
 124. At least one of the complaints in the Akorn action styled itself as a class action. Complaint 
at 1, Akorn, 385 F. Supp. 3d 616 (N.D. Ill. 2019) (No. 1:17-cv-05018).  
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On the other hand, the potential for plaintiffs’ counsel to extract 
mootness fee payments in exchange for voluntarily dismissing frivolous 
complaints is not limited to merger cases. As a result, we suggest that 
it may be desirable for the Federal Rules Committee to consider 
incorporating these requirements into FRCP 23. To address the 
potential for plaintiffs’ counsel to use a putative class action to obtain a 
mootness fee without obtaining meaningful recovery for the plaintiff 
class, we propose that FRCP 23 be amended to require disclosure and 
court approval if counsel seeks a fee award or other payment in 
connection with the voluntary dismissal of a proposed class action, even 
if that dismissal occurs prior to class certification.125  
Our proposed amendment to FRCP 23 takes the following form: 
 
FRCP 23(e)(5)(B)(iii) 
Unless approved by the court after a hearing, no payment or other 
consideration may be provided in connection with the voluntary 
dismissal of a proposed class action. 
 
By providing notice and requiring judicial approval, the court 
would be able to hear from objectors to the payment and determine if 
the payments were justified under the appropriate legal standard, such 
as the one provided in the Trulia case.126 Given the dubious nature of 
the benefits to defendants of mootness fee payments, and the likelihood 
that shareholders would object to the practice, we anticipate that 
disclosure would substantially reduce defendants’ willingness to pay 
mootness fees.127  
 
 125. As it currently stands, FED. R. CIV. P. 41 allows for voluntary dismissal without court 
approval, subject to FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e). FED. R. CIV. P. 23 was amended recently in order to stop 
a similar practice of objector blackmail, whereby an objector to a class action settlement would 
intervene for nonmeritorious reasons to delay the closing of the settlement until the delay 
pressured class counsel or the defendant to pay them to go away. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(5)(B)-(C) 
were added to require court approval of a payment “provided in connection with: (i) forgoing or 
withdrawing an objection, or (ii) forgoing, dismissing, or abandoning an appeal.” This practice was 
documented in Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The End of Objector Blackmail?, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1623 (2009). 
The Standing Committee’s report to the Judicial Conference discusses these amendments. COMM. 
ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, SUMMARY OF THE REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 
COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (2017), https://www.uscourts.gov/ 
sites/default/files/2017-09-jcus-report_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/D2WC-6FK5] [hereinafter SUMMARY 
OF JCC REPORT]. 
 126. Alternatively, courts should issue standing orders in merger litigation cases requiring 
that any payment of fees be reported to the court prior to payment.  
 127. We recognize that plaintiffs’ attorneys could attempt to style their cases as individual and 
not class actions to avoid this rule. However, the commentary to the rule should specifically note 
that an action providing class-wide benefits such as a disclosure settlement would be considered 
covered by the Rule. We also believe that, to the extent plaintiffs’ counsel sought mootness fee 
payments in a case not involving a class action, payment of a mootness fee could potentially 
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Our proposal would align with both the purpose of FRCP 23 as 
well as Delaware’s approach to the subject; specifically, it would 
address the risk of nonmeritorious cases that are filed for the purpose 
of attempting to extract a fee payment. We note that FRCP 23 was 
previously amended to address similar concerns in connection with the 
filing and subsequent withdrawal of objections to settlements. In 2017, 
FRCP 23 was amended to require court approval for any payment to an 
objector to a class settlement in connection with the objector’s 
withdrawal of the objection. The rationale cited by the standing 
committee was that “[a]lthough the payment may advance class 
interests in a particular case, allowing payment perpetuates a system 
that can encourage objections advanced for improper purposes.”128 A 
rule requiring court approval of mootness fee payments would align 
with this approach of preventing rent seeking through judicial 
oversight of similar fee payments. It would also align with the 
transparency and court-supervised process that FRCP 23 promotes.  
Similarly, our proposal is consistent with Delaware law on the 
subject. Delaware law specifically requires that the payment of a 
mootness fee be accompanied by notice to shareholders to prevent “ ‘the 
risk of buy off’ of plaintiffs’ counsel.”129 As explained in Trulia: 
As the Court recently stated, “notice is appropriate because it provides the information 
necessary for an interested person to object to the use of corporate funds, such as by 
‘challeng[ing] the fee payment as waste in a separate litigation,’ if the circumstances 
warrant.” In other words, notice to stockholders is designed to guard against potential 
abuses in the private resolution of fee demands for mooted representative actions.130 
To the extent federal courts do not impose this regime under 
their inherent authority, as the Akorn court did, an amendment of 
FRCP 23 would thus align with notions of transparency and 
shareholder interests that are embedded in both the federal and 
Delaware civil procedure rules.131 In this regard, we advocate that 
Delaware further modify its standard to formalize the requirements of 
 
constitute waste given the discrepancy between the payment and an individual plaintiff’s potential 
interest in the litigation.  
 128. SUMMARY OF JCC REPORT, supra note 125, at 291.  
 129. In re Trulia Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 898 (Del. Ch. 2016).  
 130. Id.  
 131. We note that, because our proposal extends to complaints that are filed as proposed class 
actions but dismissed prior to certification, it could be understood as interfering with a litigant’s 
right to voluntarily dismiss an individual claim. Our response is that, at least in merger litigation, 
the purported justification for the mootness fee is the class-wide benefit in the form of 
supplemental disclosures, and that a mootness fee would not be warranted absent that 
justification. Because plaintiffs’ counsel is leveraging class status to obtain a fee payment, the 
cases should be understood in those terms.  
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notice to the court and judicial approval of mootness fees in proposed 
class actions. 
C. Revision of the Substantive Mootness Fee Standard 
We also propose that courts in Delaware and elsewhere revise 
the substantive standard for the approval of mootness fees and limit 
that approval to cases in which the supplemental disclosures that have 
the effect of rendering the litigation moot are clearly material under the 
Trulia standard. Plaintiffs’ counsel should not be rewarded for 
uncovering and correcting immaterial disclosure violations. 
Elimination of the weakened standard for recovery of fee awards in 
mootness cases would substantially reduce the frequency with which 
litigation is filed that does not benefit the company or its shareholders. 
We note that the Akorn court adopted this approach. Applying 
Walgreen, the court determined that the relevant issue was whether the 
supplemental disclosures requested in plaintiffs’ initial complaint were 
“plainly material.”132 It then reviewed the additional disclosures to 
determine whether they met this standard and concluded that they did 
not.133  
From a cost-benefit perspective, these simple changes would 
undoubtedly be beneficial. As we estimated earlier, the direct costs of 
mootness fees likely amounted to at least $23 million in 2017. Of course, 
mootness litigation creates other significant indirect costs arising out of 
the lack of transparency and the judicial time lost when trying to apply 
the unworkable legal standard for adjudicating these cases. These costs 
would all be saved by the rule change, although there might be some 
offsetting increase in the effort associated with judicial review. If courts 
adopt the Trulia standard, however, even these costs should quickly 
decrease as fewer of these cases are filed. 
Events in the Delaware courts subsequent to Trulia support our 
proposal. As our analysis shows, weak merger cases migrated out of 
Delaware after Trulia, but litigation in Delaware did not end. Instead, 
as we discussed in Part I, plaintiffs’ lawyers continue to file lawsuits 
raising meaningful challenges to mergers in Delaware. These cases 
commonly involve allegations of conflict of interest, the focus of the 
Delaware courts these days, and in large part they are litigated more 
extensively and often result in substantial benefits for the plaintiff 
 
 132. House v. Akorn, Inc., 385 F. Supp. 3d 616, 622–23 (N.D. Ill. 2019).  
 133. Id.  
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class.134 Most recently, In re Calamos Asset Management Stockholder 
Litigation resulted in a settlement of $30 million.135 
CONCLUSION 
In this Article, we empirically analyze the latest development in 
merger litigation: the mootness fee. We find that this type of disposition 
now dominates merger litigation. In 2018, 83% of deals were subject to 
litigation, and an average of 63% of these cases resulted in the payment 
of a mootness fee. The rise of the mootness fee has resulted in the 
demise of the disclosure-only settlement. It has also resulted in the 
precipitous decline of merger litigation filed in Delaware; only 2% of 
cases brought in 2018 involving Delaware-incorporated targets were 
filed exclusively in Delaware, a remarkable decline from 57% of these 
cases filed in 2015.  
We argue that the rise of the mootness fee is not beneficial from 
a capital markets perspective and is instead a form of blackmail in 
which defendants pay mootness fees not on the merits but simply to 
avoid vexatious litigation. This practice persists due to a lack of 
transparency associated with mootness fee payments and the absence 
of sufficient judicial oversight.  
We conclude that change is needed. First, the migration of 
disclosure-based merger litigation to federal courts is not the source of 
the problem. Federal courts have core competencies in evaluating 
disclosure claims, and they should apply those competencies to merger 
litigation cases. However, federal courts should also adopt mechanisms 
to ensure that mootness fees are rendered transparent to both the 
courts and to shareholders. This transparency can be accomplished by 
individual courts like the one in Akorn requiring the disclosure of 
mootness fees or, alternatively, standardizing the requirement of 
disclosure and court approval of mootness fees in merger litigation 
through an amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Second, 
 
 134. Examples include the settlements related to the buyouts of Examworks ($86.5 million), 
FrontFour ($47 million), Good Technology ($52 million), and Starz ($92.5 million). See Joel 
Friedlander, Confronting the Problem of Fraud on the Board, BUS. LAW. (forthcoming Winter 
2019–2020) (manuscript at 37–40), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=3359402&download=yes [https://perma.cc/U7SG-26ZV] (discussing the Good Technology and 
Examworks settlements); Medley and FrontFour Reach Settlement Terms on Proposed Merger, 
Postpone Shareholder Vote, DI WIRE (Apr. 9, 2019), https://thediwire.com/medley-frontfour-reach-
settlement-terms-proposed-merger-postpone-shareholder-vote/ [https://perma.cc/GUM2-9FHJ]; 
Jeff Montgomery, Chancery OKs $92.5M Deal To End $4.4B Starz Merger Suit, LAW360 (Dec. 10, 
2018), https://www.law360.com/articles/1109603/chancery-oks-92-5m-deal-to-end-4-4b-starz-
merger-suit [https://perma.cc/23SY-V6C4].  
 135. Stipulation and Agreement of Compromise and Settlement at 23, In re Calamos Asset 
Mgmt., Inc. Stockholder Litig., No. 2017-0058-JTL (Del. Ch. Jan. 11, 2019). 
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we argue that in evaluating the proposed payment of a mootness fee in 
cases involving supplemental merger disclosures, courts should reject 
the Xoom standard, which does not require materiality but allows 
payment of a mootness fee in cases in which the disclosures provide any 
arguable benefit. Instead, the courts should condition the payment of 
mootness fees on the correction of material disclosure violations.  
Merger litigation has existed for decades, and challenges to 
merger processes and disclosures have led to important reforms and, in 
many cases, substantial recoveries for class members. The cases that 
result in voluntary dismissals and the payment of mootness fees, 
however, are not meritorious cases. Trulia reduced the impact and cost 
of merger litigation challenges that do not produce meaningful value for 
the plaintiff class by increasing judicial scrutiny of disclosure-only 
settlements coupled with fee awards. It also resulted in the filing of 
disclosure challenges where they belong—in federal court. A final step 
is needed, subjecting mootness fees in federal court to the same scrutiny 
imposed by the Trulia line of cases. Such a step would eliminate this 
type of frivolous litigation altogether and finally end the era of 
widespread merger litigation. 
